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Abstract: This study examines the impact of real estate brokers on the price of residential 
properties sold in 2005 in twelve French cities. The results indicate that brokers increase the 
prices of properties they sell even though they appear to have heterogeneous behaviours 
across cities.  The impact of brokers also varies by property size and age of clients. One and 
two room apartments have higher selling prices when sold through brokers. Buyers in their 
thirties and forties who seek the assistance of brokers pay more for their homes whereas older 
sellers obtain higher prices from broker intermediation.
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21. Introduction
Housing expenditures represent a large part of household spending and is a major economic 
indicator in industrialized economies. As the real estate brokerage industry plays an important 
role in the residential market, it is worth analyzing the impact of this industry on the sale price 
of houses. The present paper examines the effect of real estate intermediation on sale price in 
the French residential market. 
A recent national survey
2  conducted by the  Direction générale de la concurrence, de la 
consommation et de la répression des fraudes - which is the French agency in charge of 
ensuring fair trade and competition - found evidence of numerous offences in the real estate 
brokerage industry. Out of the 1070 real estate agencies that were inspected, 830 (77.6%) 
were in violation of the law. The main infractions concerned misleading advertising, absence 
of commission displays in the agencies, absence of professional ID card, and real estate 
agents' operating without mandate from owners. The impact of real estate agents on housing 
prices is an important issue as, along with the frauds recorded in the survey, it may potentially 
trigger legislative changes in the real estate brokerage industry.
Home sellers  may either try to sell their house on their own or seek the assistance of 
professionals. The real estate broker is one of these professionals (notaries may also act as 
broker in France, however they do not enter in the field of the present study; we will focus 
only on real estate brokers). A seller, marketing his house without intermediation of real 
estate brokers, bears the cost of searching for buyers and the cost of showing the house. 
Similarly, home buyers face the costs of gathering information. These costs are borne by real 
estate brokers when involved in the transaction. Indeed the main role of the real estate broker 
is to match the level of housing desired by buyers with houses proposed for sale. In order to 
2 Published in the review Concurrence & Consommation, n° 154, July-August-September 2007.
3accomplish this task, they collect information about both buyers and sellers, and house 
characteristics. Under French law
3, the real estate agent has the obligation to inform and 
advise both the buyer and the seller, guarantee the reliability of the transaction, facilitate the 
bargaining process, and carry through the transaction. For all these services, the broker 
charges a fee which, depending on the real estate brokerage contract, can be either at the 
seller’s expenses, the buyer’s expenses or shared between the two. Generally the commission 
paid to the broker is a percentage of the sale price which is displayed in the agency but can be 
negotiated. Brokers have the incentive to sell at the highest price in order to withdraw a higher 
cash commission but this may be washed out by timely marketing costs and competitive 
pressure from direct negotiation between buyers and sellers. In the opposite direction we have 
to mention the popular belief, widespread among the real estate brokers in France, that 
consists in asserting that individuals who sell their good by themselves tend to increase the 
house price. The broker’s job is then to bring back the prices to their market level, convincing 
the seller to decrease its price. But, is this a real social justification of the usefulness of the 
brokers, or just a commercial argument? As we can see, the price impact of the brokers is not 
necessarily obvious at first glance; one of the aims of this article is to disentangle the situation 
and to study the sign of this impact. 
The   empirical   literature   provides   conflicting   evidence   on   the   impact   of   real   estate 
intermediation on housing prices. It is presumably due to differences in statistical methods, 
small sample sizes and geographically concentrated data. Moreover, most studies have 
focused on American data and none have, to our knowledge, examined the effect of brokers 
on prices in the French residential market. In this paper we estimate the effect of real estate 
brokers on housing prices using a large set of transactions realised in 2005 from twelve 
French cities dispersed nationwide
4. The database includes home sales performed with and 
3 Hoguet act of January 2, 1970
4 The city of Paris is not included in this study because the information concerning the presence or not of a 
broker in the transaction was not available. 
4without the assistance of a broker. We model housing prices as a function of house 
characteristics according to the classical hedonic approach and whether or not a real estate 
broker takes part in the transaction. 
The results of the study indicate that real estate agents increase housing prices by on average 
1.3%. But they seem to have heterogeneous behaviours across cities. In particular, the level of 
influence of real estate brokers on housing prices is not homogenous across cities and not 
always   significant.   Brokers   tend   to   influence   the   price   of   small   accommodations. 
Furthermore, men have a higher probability of buying through a broker and brokers appear to 
increase the selling price of houses bought and sold by single men. Buyers under forty and 
sellers under thirty years old who presumably lack experience in the real estate market are 
more likely to seek the assistance of a broker. Buyers fifty years old tend to pay more for their 
homes whereas older sellers obtain higher prices when using a broker.
Section 2 reviews the literature on the effect of real estate intermediation on house prices and 
search duration. The French real estate brokerage industry is described in section 3. The data 
and methodology are presented in section 4. Section 5 contains the empirical results and the 
final section presents the conclusions of the study.
2. Literature Review
The literature on the determinants of housing prices including traditional estimates of housing 
demand, hedonic modeling of housing prices, models of the search and bargaining processes 
is extensive. However, few researchers have studied the direct effects of real estate agency 
representation on the housing market and in particular on home selling prices. Conflicting 
results have risen from empirical studies on this important topic. Some conclude that real 
estate brokers do influence the selling prices of homes, others refute such effect. Moreover, 
results also differ across house price ranges. The lack of consensus in the literature may 
5reflect the fact that the data used was too local and sample sizes relatively small. In addition, 
early empirical results were not systematically corrected for selection bias in the samples. 
Indeed, Jud, Elder, Zumpano and Baryla, among others, have shown that buyers who buy 
through a broker have different characteristics and different housing consumption level than 
those who search by themselves.
Jud (1983) estimated the demand for real estate brokerage services by both sellers and buyers 
using a conditional Logit model. The results obtained from 529 housing transaction data in 
1979 from three urban areas in North Carolina indicated that home sellers’ decision to engage 
a real estate broker mainly depends on housing market transaction costs including the cost of 
seller’s time. For home buyers, Jud found that the decision to use a broker during housing 
search was determined by the buyer’s prior knowledge of the housing market and the 
opportunity cost of the buyer’s time. Jud measured the buyer’s information level on the 
housing market by identifying whether or not the buyer was a local resident, familiar with the 
market and whether or not the buyer was an experienced previous owner. It appeared that 
higher income buyers were more likely to employ a broker. Buyers who seek the assistance of 
brokers conducted more rapid searches and spend substantially more on housing. Jud found 
that brokers do not influence the prices of the houses they sell, although they do increase the 
level of housing consumption of buyers.
In a subsequent paper, Jud and Frew (1986), using different data (one single area in North 
Carolina) and methods, found that broker-assisted home sellers obtain higher prices for their 
homes. They confirmed the previous conclusion that broker-assisted home buyers have higher 
demands for housing than buyers who do not employ real estate agents. They suggested that 
broker intermediation generates sales effect similar to that of advertising. Indeed, brokers play 
a screening role for sellers by matching up potential buyers whose demand for housing 
corresponds to the houses of the sellers they represent. 
6Black and Nourse (1995) examined the effect of two brokerage modes on both price and 
closing cost allocations between buyers and sellers based on only 80 single-family residential 
sales between early 1989 to mid-1990 in north suburban Atlanta, Georgia. The first model, the 
seller-only representation, corresponded to the situation where the seller is represented either 
by a listing broker only or, by a selling broker acting as a subagent to the listing broker. The 
second involved buyers represented by buyers’ broker, the sellers being either represented by 
listing broker or unrepresented. They demonstrated that buyers’ broker managed to shift a 
substantial portion of closing costs to the seller. This shift was most pronounced above a low 
level of house prices, at which the seller absorbs most closing costs regardless of the mode of 
brokerage. Employing a hedonic pricing model, they found no significant impact on home 
prices based on the brokerage mode used in the transaction. This means that buyers do not 
obtain lower prices by hiring buyers’ agent. 
Bajtelsmit and Worzala (1997) applied legal and economic theory of agency to anticipate the 
impact of adversarial brokerage and separate buyer representation on transaction prices, on 
both buyer’s and seller’s net gain relative to their reservation price, and on commission fee 
paid to brokers. They compared the theoretical bargaining outcomes among transactions with 
no brokers, with one broker representing the seller under an exclusive right-to-sell contract, 
with two brokers and the buyer informed that the second broker is a subagent also working on 
behalf of the seller, with two brokers and the buyer unaware of the sub agency situation, and 
with two agents and the buyer being represented by a buyer broker. Commission fees were set 
as a percentage of the transaction price.
The theoretical results of Bajtelsmit and Worzala (1997) indicated that the no-broker case 
yields the lowest sale price and largest net benefits to the buyer and the seller. The 
transactions which involved a single broker and two brokers with disclosed agency are found 
to result in higher prices and lower net gains but still an equitable split between the buyer and 
7the seller. The situation in which two agents do not disclose agency relation to the buyer, the 
model anticipated the highest sale price, seller net benefit superior to the one obtained in the 
two previous scenarios, and a zero net benefit to the buyer. The latter case is unfavourable to 
the buyer as he mistakenly believes that the subagent is his representative and therefore may 
reveal confidential information such as reservation price. Finally, buyer brokerage and agency 
disclosed to the seller with percentage commissions and equal bargaining power yielded the 
same sale price as in the no-broker case but a lower equitable net benefit. All the agency 
arrangements considered lowers the seller’s net proceeds and increases the buyer’s net costs 
than the no-broker case. However, brokerage services enable to reduce search time and 
administrative tasks which are not accounted for in the authors’ theoretical model. 
Zumpano, Elder and Baryla (1996), using a Heckman two-stage model and 2,495 cross-
sectional observations from the United-States in 1986, examined the decision to use a real 
estate broker and the effect this decision has on house prices. The estimated results suggested 
that buyers with high opportunity costs
5  and the least amount of information about local 
housing market conditions were more likely to engage a real estate broker. They found 
presence of selection bias as buyers who use brokers tend to purchase more expensive homes. 
In a subsequent study, Elder, Zumpano and Baryla (2000), using a smaller dataset of home 
transactions (from 558 to almost 900)  carried out in the latter part of 1995 from over 600 
counties in the US, tested for the impact of buyer brokers on selling price and search duration 
by examining different type of brokerage intermediation. It appears that higher income buyers 
are more likely to seek the assistance of a buyer’s agent, as are those with more information 
and experience of the housing market. They show that real estate brokers have no independent 
effect on home prices, regardless of the type of broker. However, brokers and especially buyer 
brokers do manage to reduce buyers’ search time. 
5 Annual income is used as a proxy for opportunity costs. 
8Benjamin and Chinloy (2000), using a sample of  176 single-family houses from two 
neighbourhoods in northwest Washington sold in 1992, examined the use of buyers’ broker 
through two alternative house marketing strategies. The pricing strategy adopted by motivated 
sellers who set their listing price at or below market price in hopes of a timely sale. 
Alternatively, the exposure strategy consist of setting the listing price above the market price, 
and increasing advertising and brokers’ effort in order to obtain a higher final price. They 
found a positive relation between buyer brokerage and increasing listing prices. The authors 
conclude that sellers’ brokers concentrated their time on sellers following the pricing strategy. 
In the case of the exposure strategy, sellers’ brokers spend less effort on searching for buyers 
and, therefore, are more inclined to accept to split their commission with a buyer broker who 
brings in a client. 
Zietz and Newsome (2001), examined whether and to what extend the buyer’s agent 
commission rate affected transaction prices using a data set of 592 house sales from Orem, 
Utah, from 1990 to 1997. They found that higher commission rate led to higher sale price 
only for houses at the lower end of the market. The coefficient calculated from higher priced 
houses was positive, but not significant. They suggested that buyers of higher priced houses 
are more experienced in dealing with real estate brokers and are, therefore, less likely to be 
influenced by them. Alternatively, they postulated that the higher commission on lower-priced 
homes provided a minimum dollar amount under which the buyer broker would not bore the 
cost of spending time searching for potential buyers.
Zietz and Newsome (2002) used a larger sample of 1334 house transactions in Orem from 
mid-1999 to mid-2000 to examine the impact on price of the type of agent representation. 
They found that unrepresented buyers of small-to-medium-sized houses paid on average 2% 
more for their houses than buyers who were represented by buyers’ agent.  However, for these 
types of houses, raising the commission percentage paid to the buyer’s agent raised price. 
9Therefore, redistribution of the commission toward buyer’s agent may completely offset the 
price advantage obtained from hiring a buyer’s agent. Smaller and larger houses showed no 
statistically significant coefficients with respect to buyer’s agency. Buyers of medium-to-large 
houses represented by a buyer’s agent from the same firm as the listing agent get a better deal 
for their homes. 
Evans and Kolbe (2005) used a repeated-sale price index model to examine the effect of 
agency choice on the profit made by owners when re-selling their homes. Based on over 4,000 
repeat sales between late 1997 and early 2003 in Memphis, Tennessee, they first showed that 
dual agency, which involves one agent representing both buyer and seller, had no compelling 
impact on expected gain or on heteroskedasticity. This supports the fact that dual agency does 
not generate a systematic bias in favour of either buyers or sellers nor are there large effects of 
agent misrepresentation. They, then, found that homeowners employing the agent who sold 
them the house as the listing agent upon resale is a major source of heteroskedasticity and is 
associated with increased price gains over the tenure period.  
3. The French Real Estate Brokerage Industry
The real estate agent is an intermediary  involved in the transactions of purchase, sale, 
exchange, subletting or rent of houses, apartments, businesses, grounds. He represents one of 
the parties which can be the buyer, the seller, the owner or the tenant. In France, the ethics of 
real estate activities is defined by the Hoguet act of January 2, 1970. It has been modified by 
the Edict of July 1, 2004.
An individual who wishes to sell his house may seek the assistance of a real estate broker. In 
this case, a real estate brokerage contract signed between both parties is compulsory in order 
to give mandate to the real estate agent to start searching for a buyer. The real estate 
brokerage contract indicates the mission of the real estate agent, the description of the house 
10to be sold, the expiration date of the contract, the price wished by the seller for his house, the 
amount of the financial compensation due to the agent, and who of the seller or the buyer pays 
the commission. The financial compensation can be flat or a percentage on the selling price 
generally set from 5 to 10%. It is usually paid by the buyer as it is added to the selling price of 
the house. The percentage of the commission varies according to the price of the house. 
Generally the higher the selling price, the lower the commission. The real estate agents are 
free to choose the fees they charge but they have the obligation to display them in the agency. 
Naturally the client may negotiate the fees with the broker. Moreover, even if real estate 
agencies often get along to apply similar commissions, during the negotiation process, the 
buyer may put the agencies in competition to obtain a lower commission and hence a lower 
selling price. 
The real estate agent has the obligation to inform and advice not only the principal, but also 
all the prospective buyers. He also has to facilitate the bargaining process and complete the 
transaction. The agent has to give a true valuation of the house to the seller. 
The real estate agent operates with a license renewable annually. Since January 2006, three 
types of professional ID cards exist: transactions on buildings and business, real estate 
management, and listing agents. To obtain the professional ID card, the applicant has to fill in 
the following conditions: 
- In terms of education he must hold either a two year degree after high school in the field of 
real estate or, a three year degree in the areas of legal, economic or commercial studies.  If the 
applicant does not hold any of these diplomas, he must attest of a professional experience in 
the real estate sector either of at least three years if he has the high school diploma or an 
equivalent diploma, or of at least ten years if he has none of these diplomas (reduced to four 
years in the case of an executive position);
11- Have a financial guarantee which must be at least equal to the maximum amount of funds he 
will hold;
- Obtain a certificate from the register of the Chamber of Commerce;
- Subscribe to civil liability insurance.
- Have an attestation delivered by his bank specifying the account number on which the 
client’s money will be deposited   
- He must have never been condemned for an offence quoted in the Hoguet law.
Thus, it is fairly easy to obtain a real estate agent ID card. It is even easier to obtain a 
salesperson license (grey card). The only requirement is to never have been condemned for 
the same offences than those required for real estate agents.  The salesperson generally 
employed by a real estate agency is in charge of matching buyers and sellers. His job also 
consists of routine tasks such as placing signs on properties, posting advertisement in 
newspaper, on the Internet, or in the agency, and updating client files. The salesperson 
receives a commission on the sales which is specified in his employment contract and can 
vary according to his status (employee or independent negotiator).
The real estate brokerage industry is attractive to entrepreneurs who hope to earn money fast. 
There are no stocks to manage, the initial investment is small, and salespersons are paid on 
their performance. Therefore the turn over is significant and every day new agencies open 
hoping to take advantage of this situation. A quick glance in the Yellow Pages (dated as of 
September 2007) reveals that, in Paris, one can find  629 flower shops, 753 banks, 872 
bakeries, 2,326 “cafés”, and 3,191 real estate agencies. This can also be observed in other 
French cities. 
Baker (2007) examines the ethics of legal standards that limit entry into the American real 
estate brokerage industry. He finds that raising educational requirements increases the average 
commissions, without improving  the quality of brokerage services. In France, as the 
12educational and experience standards for real estate brokers are fairly low, it encourages high 
competition between brokers especially these last years since prices in the real estate market 
have risen considerably. Moreover, competition with the for-sale-by-owner market is fierce; 
40%  of real estate transactions are concluded without the intermediation of a real estate 
broker. Concerning the remaining 60%, real estate agents have to compete against notary and 
listing agents. In spite of the high level of competition in the real estate market, the 
commissions applied by brokers are persistently high. 
4. Data and Methodology
Data
The study uses residential real estate data from the PERVAL database. PERVAL gathers 
information on real estate transactions outside Paris region collected by notaries at the time of 
the sale. The data totaled 10,610 residential apartment transactions from twelve cities in 
France (including neighborhood distinction in Lyon and Marseille
6) realized in 2005. The data 
set included assisted (7,495) and non-assisted (3,115) home sales, housing characteristics and 
information  on both buyers  and sellers. Assisted transactions  are concluded  with the 
intermediation of real estate agents or real estate developers. 
Methodology
We aim to examine the effect of real estate brokers on housing prices in comparison with 
prices obtained by owners selling their own houses. Buyers’ and sellers’ have the choice 
between undertaking their search alone or with the assistance of a real estate broker. As 
previous researches have shown, the decision to use a broker and the price paid by buyers are 
the two sides of the problem.
6For Marseille there are seventeen categorical variables: one for each sixteen districts and one that gathers all the 
transactions that lack information on the district. We kept the latter variable as even though there is no precision 
on the location these transactions bring valuable information. 
13We model the choice to use a broker by estimating two Probit equations. The dependent 
variable is the dummy variable RE which is equal to one if a real estate broker is used in the 
transaction and zero otherwise. In the first equation, RE is explained with the classical 
hedonic variables (physical characteristics mainly). In the second equation, we explain RE 
with the buyers’ and sellers’ characteristics. 
We then estimate whether or not real estate brokers affect the prices of transactions. We 
regress the selling price per square meters (PM2) on the hedonic variables and the presence or 
not of a real estate broker. PM2 is always a gross price which does not include the broker’s 
commission.  We then practice regressions on subsamples as housing characteristics do not 
necessarily have a unique price across the full sample due to heterogeneous individual 
preferences. In particular, when individuals have different preferences for housing features, 
individuals may pay different prices for these features even though the hedonic price surface 
is the same. We construct subsamples according to independent housing and individual 
variables. 
Variables
The city location is used as a measure of real estate brokerage implantation or area habits. It 
may turn out that, in some cities, the real estate brokerage industry is more active than in 
others. Moreover brokers from different cities may not have homogenous behaviours and thus 
not affect prices the same way. The period of construction is employed to control for age in 
the real estate markets. Indeed, the value of buildings depends on the construction period, as 
some periods may be more prestigious than others and therefore more demanded.   For 
example, old styles such as  art nouveau  (1890-1914) and  art deco  (1920-1939) that fall 
respectively in the second and third categories are much-sought. On the contrary, buildings 
constructed after World War II in response to the housing shortage crisis are less valued. The 
age   variable   is   also   a   proxy   for   the   obsolescence.   Another   point   concerns   the  “loi 
14Robien” which was passed in 2003, in response to the housing shortage crisis, to stimulate 
real estate investment in order to face rental demand and to boost the real estate construction 
market. The Robien law concerns new accommodations rented as main homes and for a 
minimum of 9 years. The rents are blocked under an upper limit according to the geographical 
location. It enables real estate investors to lower their income-tax while building up a real 
estate holding. Indeed, investors can deduct 6% of the price during the first seven years and 
4% during the following two years.   Moreover, the rents benefit from 6 % abatement. 
Ultimately, with this law, an investor can deduct up to 65% of the amount invested. The law 
did increase investment in the new housing market and especially for small accommodations.
The number of rooms is included to control for the fact that the bigger the apartment, the 
smaller the price per square meter. Also, small accommodations are more frequent and are 
more demanded in cities than big apartments which can be found usually in the suburbs. 
The decision to use a broker may also depend on the type of apartment.  Duplexes and 
triplexes may be harder to sell than standard goods and therefore brokers may be more 
successful in matching buyers and sellers. We control this phenomenon with the variables 
Standard, Loft, Duplex and Triplex. 
The month in which the closing of sale occurred is included to account for price variations in 
the real estate market. Estimations reveal that there is an increasing trend of prices through the 
calendar year although the first months of the year are not always significant. For more details 
see annex 1.
The socio-occupational categories developed by the National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques: INSEE) for 
coding the population census is employed as a measure of opportunity cost of search. Even 
though, there are only eight categories, it gives indication on income levels and social 
characteristics. People from the socio-occupational categories Managers and higher-grade 
15occupations, Intermediate-grade occupations, Clerical workers, and Manual workers are 
predominant in the buyers’ population and a little bit less present in the sellers’ group. On the 
contrary, the retired category is more active on the sell-side than on the buy-side. It is well 
known in the literature that real estate broker reduces the search duration of their clients. 
Hence, higher social categories, with presumably higher opportunity costs, will probably 
choose to engage a real estate broker.
Other characteristics such as matrimonial status, age, or nationality may also affect the 
decision to engage a real estate broker. Nationality is included to assess informational 
advantages on the real estate market that French people may have relatively to foreigners. 
Individuals with less knowledge of the market may have a greater incentive to seek the 
assistance of a broker. Moreover, buyers coming from countries with expensive housing could 
spend more for their houses in the destination city. Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006) find 
that households moving from more expensive cities spend more in rent in their new city than 
those coming from cheaper cities, holding other factors constant.  They also show that as 
people stay in their new city, they get used to the new prices and readjust their housing 
expenditures. 
Finally, the variable RE indicates whether and to what extent real estate brokers affect the sale 
price of houses they sell. A positive significant coefficient would suggest that real estate 
brokers do increase the price of houses they sell. A complete description of the variables used 
in this study can be found in Table 1. Summary statistics are displayed in Tables 2a and 2b. 
The first three columns show statistics for the broker-assisted, the non-broker-assisted, and 
the full sample respectively. The last column gives, for each variable, the proportion of 
broker-assisted transactions in the full sample.
165. Empirical Results
The Probit Models
The Probit estimates of the decision to use a broker are found in Tables 3 and 4. The omitted 
categories for each characteristic define a base; the intercept is associated to the probability 
for this initial situation. The dummy variable coefficients for the remaining categories 
measure the extent to which the probability to use a broker differ from the base. Buyers 
falling into the socio-occupational categories artisans, shopkeepers, and employers, and other 
persons without occupational activity are more inclined to use a real estate broker. 
For the artisans we may consider that their purchase is sometimes not purely residential. It is 
quite frequent to have the shop at the ground floor and the apartment at the first floor. The 
commercial side of the trade is maybe the reason why a broker is used more frequently. But 
this result could also be interpreted as an opportunity cost problem. Indeed, these categories 
have usually some strong time constraints due to their job. The latter category of course 
includes unemployed individuals searching for jobs but not only.  It may also include 
housewives, house husbands, heirs, retired persons too young  to fall into the retired 
category… We  assume that people who have money problems do not purchase houses. 
Hence, buyers who fall into this category are assumed to be wealthy and therefore are maybe 
more willing to pay for the services of real estate brokers. None of the socio-occupational 
coefficients for sellers are significant.
Buyers in their thirties are statistically more likely to use a broker in their search but the 
coefficient is very small. These buyers may lack of time as they usually have early-aged 
children which are time consuming. Moreover, these young buyers may be first time owners 
and therefore, have less knowledge on the real estate market than more experienced buyers. 
Indeed, it may be their first time buying a house. Sellers aged between thirty and seventy nine 
years have lower probabilities of seeking the assistance of a broker. This is especially true for 
17sellers in their fifties, sixties, and seventies. These sellers may have some experience of the 
real estate market as they may already have sold a house previously. Moreover, as all the 
coefficients of sellers’ age variables are negative this means that the omitted category, which 
corresponds to sellers between 18 and 29 years old, tend to use brokers while trying to sell 
their apartment (the percentage of the sellers in this category is 6.8%) .    
Divorced women tend to search for houses on their own. In France, women usually obtain 
custody and, even though they receive alimony, part of the household revenue is lost 
following the divorce. So, with less money, they would try to find approximately the same 
type of apartment than the one they used to live in before the divorce and therefore save the 
commission due to the broker. On the contrary, divorced men are more likely to employ a real 
estate broker to help them find a home. Women under a PACS (Pacte Civil de Solidarité) 
contract tend to search without the assistance of a broker. The coefficient is quite strong and 
significant at about an 8% level. On the contrary, the coefficient for men who have the same 
status is not at all significant. The PACS created in 1999 is bounded to homosexual couples 
who cannot legally get married but wish to have a status closed to the one of married couples 
or to couples who wish to benefit from financial, patrimonial and fiscal advantages without 
getting married. Unfortunately, the proportion of woman-woman, woman-man, and man-man 
PACS are not known as this information is for now considered confidential and therefore not 
registered.   Nevertheless   if   we   assume   that   most   PACS   contracts   in   the   category 
PACS_women are concluded between two women then the presence of male buyers seem to 
increase the probability of engaging an agent globally. Indeed, disregarding the significance 
level we note that single women, divorced women, women under a PACS contract, and 
widows tend to search for a house without the assistance of a broker. While all the 
coefficients of matrimonial status for men buyers (except for widowers), and the coefficient 
corresponding to married or remarried women (necessarily to a man) are positive. This result 
18is very interesting as it reveals that men and women have different preferences with regard to 
the way they lead their housing search. The coefficients of sellers’ matrimonial status, 
although not significant, lead to the same observations with some exceptions (single and 
remarried women). 
The nationality coefficients for both buyers and sellers are not significant in general with two 
exceptions for buyers: Spain and United Kingdom. This can be explained by the fact that 
some British and Spanish brokers are specialized in the French residential real estate market. 
British and Spanish people who wish to buy an apartment in France may then seek the 
assistance of brokers who are not licensed by the French government and therefore can not be 
registered in the Perval database as taking part of the transaction.  Note that, concerning 
buyers, all European nationality coefficients are negative whereas the ones of the remaining 
nationalities are positive with the exception of the other nationality category. This is not true 
though for sellers’ nationality.
The period  of construction enables to control for apartments in prestigious buildings and 
obsolescence. The period H includes new homes and resale of homes constructed since less 
than five years. The coefficient for this variable is negative and highly significant. Buildings 
constructed between 1992 and 1999 (period G) have also less probability to be sold with the 
assistance of agents. This is surprising as the assisted category does not only include real 
estate agents but also real estate developers and estate agents. Summary statistics reveal that 
there is a larger share of apartments constructed under these two periods in the professional 
assisted sample than in the non-assisted sample. Moreover, 76.9% and 78.3% of apartments 
falling into G and H respectively where sold through brokers. 
Triplexes have a high probability of being sold by real estate brokers even though summary 
statistics indicate that only 52.4% of triplexes in the database where sold through brokers, 
which corresponds to the smallest proportion of real estate intermediation. This can be 
19explained by the fact that in the probit equation we control for other characteristics. There are 
not many buyers seeking for this type of apartment therefore sellers may turn to brokers for 
help. Moreover, buyers searching for triplexes may have high opportunity costs and thus 
engage a broker to reduce search time. The coefficients for lofts and duplexes are not 
significant.
Concerning the number of rooms, only five-room houses have a significant coefficient which 
is negative but at an 8% level. Five-room homes are mainly sought for by large families who 
may have a high budget constraint and therefore search on their own to save the commission 
due to brokers. Although the other coefficients for houses with 3 to 8 rooms are not 
statistically   significant,   they   are   negative.   This   result   suggests   that   single-room 
accommodations are more likely to be sold by brokers. 
Houses in the fourth, eighth, fourteenth, and fifteenth districts of Marseille have a higher 
probability of being sold through a broker. See the map of Marseille segmented by districts in 
annex 2. The seven first districts builds-up the town center around the vieux port.  The fourth 
district is a little off-centered compare to the other six districts. We may suppose that buyers 
searching for apartments in the town center may not explore this district therefore sellers may 
seek the assistance of brokers in order to bring prospective buyers into this area. Concerning 
the out of center districts the eighth district is the most expensive whereas the fourteenth and 
fifteenth districts have some red-light areas. Apartments situated in Lille and Tourcoing, two 
cities in the North of France, are less likely to be marketed by brokers. The remaining 
coefficients for location are far from being significant. The summary statistics in Table 2a 
indicate that Marseille, Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, and Nantes are not homogeneous between 
the broker and the non-broker assisted transactions samples. Marseille has the smallest 
percentage of real estate broker intermediation. Furthermore, a larger part of the non-broker 
assisted sample concerns transactions in Marseille compared to the broker assisted sample. 
20The opposite is true for Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing and Nantes. The differences between the 
summary statistics and the probit results indicate that, in these cities, there may be some 
underlying characteristics that strongly impact the presence or absence of brokers in the 
transactions. 
Regressions
Several regressions of the selling price were performed. The R-squares are in majority around 
0.40 and the adjusted R-squares are about 0.33. We first estimate a regression on the full 
sample by controlling for difference in housing characteristics, and included the dummy 
variable RE which indicates the presence or the absence of a real estate broker in the 
transaction. We then model the selling price for various subsamples constructed using hedonic 
and individual characteristics. The variable of interest is of course RE as we wish to examine 
the impact of real estate brokers on the selling price of houses. The values and the 
significance levels of the coefficient RE for the full dataset and the subsambles can be found 
in Table 5. Note that even though not all coefficients are significant, the large majority is 
positive. 
The coefficient RE for the full sample is positive and statistically significant. More precisely, 
buyers who purchase their homes through real estate brokers pay on average 1.3% more for 
their homes. To account for heterogeneity across the full sample, we then estimate regressions 
on subsamples. We estimated the selling-price equation for each city. The RE coefficient was 
positively   significant   for   the  cities   Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing   (4.2%),   Marseille   (3.2%), 
Toulouse (2.5%), and Lyon (2.4%), whereas for Nantes (-3%) it was negative. These results 
are interesting because they indicate that real estate agents do not behave the same way 
nationwide. The Probit estimates revealed that in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing buyers and sellers 
were less likely to seek the assistance of a broker. This could be due to the fact that buyers in 
this area are aware of the fact that real estate brokers inflate prices and therefore are reluctant 
21to seek their assistance. Moreover, the coefficients for Toulouse and half of the districts of 
Lyon in the Probit equation even though not significant were also negative. This was not true 
though for Marseille as we showed that apartments in some districts had more probability of 
being sold by real estate agents. The Probit coefficient for Nantes was positive but not at all 
significant.
We estimate separate regressions for houses from one to six rooms. It appears that real estate 
agent increase the prices of one and two rooms apartment by respectively 3.4% and 1.9%. The 
impact of brokers on the other subsambles was not significant. This result is not surprising as 
the demand for small accommodations is large and constantly increasing due to demographic 
reasons. Indeed, these categories of houses are very demanded by retired and young couples, 
singles (single persons represent 60% of home buyers) and real estate investors’ in particular 
because of the Robien law. As the demand for these types of properties often exceeds offer, 
they usually sell really fast. Therefore, real estate professionals have no trouble finding buyers 
who are willing to pay more for these kinds of houses. 
Results for the construction period indicate that real estate agents increase the prices of houses 
built during the first four periods, especially the first one which corresponds to very old 
constructions. Interestingly, the RE coefficient is negative and significant for the subsample G 
of houses built between 1992 and 1999 and even though not significant, the coefficient for the 
subsample of new houses is also negative. The Probit estimates revealed that those two 
categories of buildings had a lower probability of being sold by real estate agents. But when 
they are sold by brokers they sell for less. This could be a result of distressed situation. 
Indeed, owners who sale their homes less than 13 years after buying it may face financial 
problems. In such a situation, sellers may be more inclined to sell cheaply and to seek the 
assistance of brokers in order to accelerate the selling process. Moreover, the Robien law 
which was passed in 2003 to boost the constructions of new accommodations gave rise to 
22investment packages including credit facilities and financial insurances hooked up with the 
purchase of apartments not yet constructed. Buyers who buy off-plan and thus through a real 
estate developer usually obtain a discount. The estimates reveal that buyers who purchase 
through brokers get a better deal for their homes but this price advantage may be washed out 
by the broker commission. Sellers of old apartments will obtain a higher price for their homes 
by engaging a broker. This could be due to the fact that brokers have more information on 
prospective buyers than owners do and therefore they can better market old apartments. 
Nevertheless, the construction period may capture other hedonic characteristics which are not 
controlled for.
We then divide the data according to the age of individuals and estimate the regressions for 
each subsample. Real estate agents have a positive impact on prices paid by buyers who are 
between thirty and forty nine years old. Buyers in their forties pay, on average, 3.65% more 
for their homes when purchasing with the help of brokers whereas buyers in their thirties pay 
1.76% more. This could be due to the fact that these categories of buyers may be first time 
buyers   and   therefore   lack   experience   and   knowledge   of   the  real   estate   market.   The 
coefficients for the other age categories of buyers are not significant. Concerning the seller’s 
age, real estate broker obtains higher selling price for their clients aged between forty and 
sixty nine. The increase is about 2.8% for the first two categories and 2.4% for the last one. 
Surprisingly they manage to increase by 4.7% the prices of homes sold by individuals over 
eighty years of age which may result from a confidence effect. Indeed, this could be ascribed 
to the fact that elderly persons have lived in their neighbourhood for a long time and may 
know the real estate agent closest to his house. It appears that young buyers spend more for 
their houses when working with a broker whereas older sellers benefit from engaging a 
broker.
23We  next examine the impact of real estate agents on the socio-occupational activities of 
buyers and sellers. Real estate brokers have a positive impact on prices paid by buyers from 
the categories intermediate-grade occupations and other persons without occupational activity 
with an increase of respectively 1.9% and 8.85%. The probit estimation showed that people in 
the latter category where more likely to work with a broker and, when they do use a broker 
they pay much more for their homes with equal hedonic surface. We assumed that people 
buying houses from this category were wealthy and had supposedly high opportunity costs. 
Therefore to avoid the annoyance of searching a house for a long time and negotiating with 
the seller, they heavily rely on the real estate agent. Brokers may take advantage of this type 
of client by raising the price of the houses in order to earn a higher money commission. 
Clerical (2.9%) and manual (5.5%) workers obtain higher prices for their homes by selling 
through a broker. Note that the coefficients for the RE variable in all the socio-occupational 
subsamples are positives with the exception of buyers falling into the managers and higher-
grade occupations category. 
Real estate brokers do not appear to discriminate between matrimonial status and gender as 
most RE coefficients are not significant. However, they seem to increase the prices of homes 
both bought and sold by single men. Brokers also statistically manage to sell widows’ homes 
for higher prices. 
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been to empirically assess whether and to what extent real estate 
agents affect the sale price of French residential properties.  Results were obtained using 
10,610 residential apartment transactions from twelve cities in France dispersed nationwide 
and registered in 2005. Prices are gross prices, that is without the broker’s fee. The estimates 
suggest that real estate brokers have a positive effect on housing price. In line with the article 
24of Zietz and Newsome (2002), we find that the impact of brokers varies by property size. 
Statistically significant positive effects were found for one and two room apartments. The 
influence of brokers also varies according to the level of experience of buyers and sellers 
measured by age. Sellers above forty years of age appeared to benefit from the services of real 
estate agents by obtaining higher prices for their homes. While buyers, between thirty and 
fifty years old, seemed to pay the tribute of their unawareness of the real estate market. 
Another major finding is that real estate agents have heterogeneous behaviors depending on 
the city location. The estimates revealed that brokers did not affect prices in all the cities 
considered and in the cities they did have influence, the level was not homogenous. 
Furthermore, we found one city in which brokers statistically decrease housing prices. 
Brokers usually claim that owners who sell their house without the assistance of brokers tend 
to demand higher prices for their good. Therefore, according to the real estate brokerage 
industry, buyers benefit from broker intermediation through lower housing prices. Our results 
do not confirm the marketing argument of brokers. Indeed, we found evidence that brokers 
increase the prices of houses they sell. In some cases, they do sell houses for lower prices but 
these prices do not include commission. The price advantage obtained by buyers could be 
washed out by the broker’s commission.
The answer to the question, to whom real estate brokers benefit the most, is obviously not the 
buyers. Although, brokers give valuable information and as it has been proved in earlier 
studies they manage to reduce search time of clients, buyers pay twice the services of brokers 
through commission and price.
The real estate brokerage industry in the United States, for example, contrary to France offers 
a complete service to clients. Indeed, American brokers who are involved in the 86%
7 of real 
estate transactions  (60% in France), do not only sell houses, they offer turnkey solutions 
which can go from the inscription of children in the new school up to the administrative tasks 
7 Baker (2007)
25linked with the house moving.  Offering a large range of services, promulgating strict rules of 
business   ethics,   ensuring   compliance   with   regard   to   these   rules,   and   harmonizing 
commissions by counting on the volume rather than the search for the highest price may be a 
solution to the French real estate brokerage industry problem. 
This paper  examined the impact of real estate brokers on housing prices.  It would be 
interesting, for further research, to study the effect of notaries on housing prices when they 
serve as intermediary in the transactions. As notaries register all real estate transactions, they 
have an informational advantage on brokers which could lead them to act differently.  
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28Annex 1 │Month of Closing
Variable Coefficient Std Error P-Value Coefficient Std Error P-Value Coefficient Std Error P-Value
February -13.49 25.11 0.5911 -36.00 56.96 0.5275 70.87 70.31 0.3137
March 52.39 24.85 0.035 46.07 53.12 0.3858 95.59 71.44 0.1811
April 61.76 24.41 0.0114 115.89 53.06 0.0291 80.43 67.87 0.2361
Mai 138.71 24.28 < 0.0001 170.26 52.82 0.0013 195.22 68.11 0.0042
June 181.39 22.87 < 0.0001 209.68 48.10 < 0.0001 184.12 65.94 0.0053
July 206.62 22.83 < 0.0001 192.31 47.73 < 0.0001 249.67 65.42 < 0.0001
August 223.44 24.05 < 0.0001 253.11 53.76 < 0.0001 295.25 71.79 < 0.0001
September 290.04 22.51 < 0.0001 242.27 47.43 < 0.0001 373.58 64.35 < 0.0001
October 277.50 24.46 < 0.0001 184.12 51.85 0.0004 324.55 74.71 < 0.0001
November 304.59 24.97 < 0.0001 223.83 52.60 < 0.0001 389.73 73.59 < 0.0001
December 308.49 23.45 < 0.0001 273.76 49.08 < 0.0001 321.47 66.54 < 0.0001
The omitted variable is January.
Table 6 │Displays the coefficients of the month in which the closing of sale occurred for the full sample, Lyon, and Toulouse. The curves are plotted in 
Graph1. 
Full sample Lyon Toulouse
The cities of Montpellier and Nancy do not show statistically significant differences between 
the months of sale. The coefficients for Marseille and Strasbourg start being significant from 
the month of June and the one for Rennes from July at a 5% level. The coefficients for Lille-
Roubaix-Tourcoing are significant from the month of July with the exception of May which is 
significant at a 5% level. February is never significant and March is significant for the full 
sample, Bordeaux, and Nantes. In all samples an increasing trend may be distinguished.
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Global sample Lyon Toulouse
29Annex 2 │Chart of Marseille
The map below represents the city of Marseille which is divided in sixteen districts. The 
seven first districts compose the town center.
Origin: http://orthoptie.net/
3031
  Table 1 │ Variable descriptions 
 
Intermediation 




Sale price (PM2): Price per square meters in euros paid by a buyer for a house. 
City: A vector of city location variables, equalling 1 if the house is situated in that city and 0 otherwise. The 
cities  are:  Bordeaux,  Lille,  Lyon  (9  urban  districts),  Marseille  (16  urban  districts  +  one  category  for 
unknown district), Montpellier, Nancy, Nantes, Rennes, Roubaix, Strasbourg, Toulouse, and Tourcoing. We 
reunited the cities of Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing as they are very near to each other 
Street type: A vector of street type variables: alley, avenue, blind alley, boulevard, crossroad, path, park, 
public garden, square, street, residence, road, etc.  
Apartment type (St, Lo, Du, Tr): A vector of apartment type variables (standard, loft, duplex, triplex).  
Rooms (Rx): A vector representing the number of rooms in the house: from 1 to 8. Houses with more than 
eight rooms are set in the 8 and more room category. 
Floor (Fx): A vector representing the floor number: from 0 to 9, floors 10 to 19 are put in the same category, 
and the last category contains floors 20 and above.  
Month of sale (Mx): A vector representing the month in which the closing of sale occurred. 
Number of cellars in the house (Cellar) 
Number of bathrooms in the house (Bath) 
Construction period (A to H): A vector of categorical variables representing the construction period. The 
categories are:  < 1850; 1851-1913; 1914-1947; 1948-1969; 1970-1980; 1981-1991; 1992-1999; 2000-2005. 
Terrace (Terrace): An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if there is a terrace and 0 otherwise. 
Balcony (Balcony): An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if there is a balcony and 0 otherwise. 
Loggia (Loggia): An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if there is a loggia and 0 otherwise. 
Storeroom (Storeroom): An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if there is a storeroom and 0 otherwise. 
Attic (Attic): An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if there is a attic and 0 otherwise. 
 
Buyers’ and sellers’ characteristics  
Socio-occupational category (SOCx): A vector of categorical socio-occupational variables, equalling 1 if the 
occupation  of  the  agent  falls  into  that  category,  0  otherwise.  The  categories  are:  Farmers;  Artisans, 
shopkeepers,  and  employers;  Managers  and  higher-grade  occupations;  Intermediate-grade  occupations; 
Clerical workers; Manual workers; Retired persons; Other persons without occupational activity.  
Matrimonial status: A vector of categorical variables that represents the matrimonial status and the gender 
of the person who signs the contract. The categories are: married, single, divorced, remarried,  PACS 
contract which corresponds to a legal contract concluded between two adults of opposite sex or not in 
order to organize their common life (equivalent of common-law), and widowed. Each category is divided 
into man and woman. 
Age (AGExx): A vector of categorical variables that represents the age of the agent. The categories are: 18-
29 years; 30-39 years; 40-49 years; 50-59 years; 60-69 years; 70-79 years; 80 years and up. 
Nationality: A vector representing different nationality: Algeria; Belgium; France; Germany; Italy; 
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Lyon (%) 21.4 21.4 21.4 70.6
Marseille (%) 13.3 20.5 15.4 61.0
Lille/ Roubaix/Tourcoing (%) 7.9 4.9 7.0 79.5
Nancy (%) 3.2 3.3 3.2 69.4
Toulouse (%) 13.3 13.4 13.4 70.5
Montpellier (%) 3.7 3.5 3.6 71.8
Rennes (%) 9.2 7.6 8.7 74.5
Nantes (%) 12.4 9.6 11.5 75.7
Bordeaux (%) 7.9 6.5 7.5 74.6
Strasbourg (%) 7.8 9.3 8.3 66.8
Standard (%) 95.1 95.7 95.3 70.5
Loft (%) 0.1 0.1 0.1 72.7
Duplex (%) 4.7 3.9 4.4 74.3
Triplex (%) 0.2 0.3 0.2 52.4
A (%) 2.4 2.3 2.4 71.4
B (%) 6.7 7.1 6.8 69.5
C (%) 9.6 10.7 9.9 68.3
D (%) 23.0 29.1 24.8 65.5
E (%) 15.2 16.4 15.5 69.1
F (%) 14.4 14.6 14.5 70.3
G (%) 11.4 8.2 10.4 76.9
H (%) 17.4 11.6 15.7 78.3
Terrace (%) 7.5 6.8 7.3 72.6
Balcony (%) 21.9 20.9 21.6 71.7
Loggia (%) 13.0 14.4 13.4 68.5
Storeroom (%) 15.6 16.2 15.8 69.8
Attic (%) 7.0 6.2 6.7 73.1
Number of rooms 2.9 2.8 2.9 //
Floor number 2.8 2.7 2.7 //
Number of cellars 0.6 0.6 0.6 //
Number of bath rooms 1.1 1.0 1.0 //
Table 2a │ Summary statistics of hedonic characteristics
The first column lists the hedonic variables. The second, third, and fourth columns give the average value or the
percentage (%) of the hedonic characteristic in the broker-assisted sample, the non-broker-assisted sample, and the full
sample respectively. For location, type of apartment, and construction period, the sum does not always equal 100 due
to approximations. Note that transactions in the city of Lyon represent 21.4% of transactions in all three samples; this
is pure coincidence. The fifth column shows the percentage of broker-assisted transactions in the full sample for each
characteristic.
Number of Observations: 7495 broker-assisted, 3115 non-agent-assisted, 10610 total
* The values in parentheses are standard error.
 
32Variable Coefficient Std Error Significance level Coefficient Std Error Significance level
Intercept -0.6339 0.28 0.0236 // // //
SOC2 0.3307 0.2005 0.0992 0.0219 0.2017 0.9134
SOC3 0.1747 0.1956 0.3717 -0.0104 0.1981 0.9582
SOC4 0.2881 0.1956 0.1409 0.00375 0.1984 0.9849
SOC5 0.2764 0.1972 0.1611 -0.0489 0.2002 0.8072
SOC6 0.3417 0.201 0.0891 -0.0569 0.2061 0.7826
SOC7 0.2773 0.2077 0.1817 0.0625 0.2004 0.7551
SOC8 0.4066 0.2066 0.0491 -0.0124 0.2058 0.952
Age 30-39 0.0968 0.0341 0.0046 -0.0892 0.0535 0.0952
Age 40-49 0.0459 0.0417 0.2715 -0.1486 0.0571 0.0093
Age 50-59 0.0171 0.0472 0.7175 -0.1713 0.0573 0.0028
Age 60-69 0.047 0.0852 0.5817 -0.2379 0.0686 0.0005
Age 70-79 0.0542 0.1113 0.6262 -0.1689 0.0792 0.033
Age 80 and over 0.0281 0.167 0.8663 -0.0843 0.0894 0.3461
Married woman 0.0462 0.0736 0.5305 0.0183 0.0513 0.7223
Single woman -0.00611 0.0399 0.8783 0.025 0.045 0.5777
Single man 0.00445 0.0364 0.9026 0.0605 0.0415 0.145
Divorced woman -0.1177 0.0548 0.0317 -0.0199 0.0532 0.7078
Divorced man 0.1108 0.0637 0.0816 0.0138 0.0582 0.8132
Remarried woman 0.1677 0.2567 0.5135 -0.0672 0.1731 0.6978
Remarried man 0.0686 0.1516 0.651 0.0696 0.0956 0.4665
PACS woman -0.5495 0.3113 0.0775 -0.4477 0.3678 0.2236
PACS man 0.0799 0.1429 0.5758 0.1114 0.2603 0.6685
Widow -0.1087 0.0902 0.228 -0.0436 0.0554 0.4314
Widower -0.1701 0.1966 0.3869 0.1326 0.1011 0.1896
Algeria 0.0661 0.2158 0.7596 0.2697 0.2499 0.2805
Belgium -0.4489 0.4468 0.315 0.4537 0.8907 0.6105
Germany -0.1387 0.3486 0.6907 0.0507 0.3775 0.8932
Italy -0.00695 0.2629 0.9789 0.021 0.2847 0.9413
Morocco 0.1092 0.2532 0.6662 0.604 0.3804 0.1124
Portugal -0.2245 0.2843 0.4298 -0.1644 0.3119 0.5982
Spain -0.7049 0.4122 0.0872 -0.4603 0.323 0.1541
Tunisia 0.4457 0.3384 0.1878 -4.236 35.7926 0.9058
Turkey 0.3511 0.2982 0.2391 0.5669 0.3764 0.1321
United Kingdom -1.0177 0.3523 0.0039 -0.3726 0.3247 0.2511
Other nationality -0.1097 0.1443 0.4471 0.2682 0.2129 0.2079
Log-likelihood (70) 126.5 <.0001
Omitted category variables are: SOC1 (Farmers), Age 18-29, Married men, and France.
Table 3 │Probit estimates of broker use as a function of individual characteristics
Seller Buyer
33Variable Coefficient Std error Significance level
Intercept 0.0591 0.246 0.8102
B 0.00675 0.0951 0.9434
C 0.0452 0.0919 0.6226
D 0.1126 0.0883 0.2022
E 0.037 0.0909 0.6837
F 0.0257 0.091 0.7779
G -0.1621 0.0944 0.086
H -0.2025 0.0897 0.024
DU 0.0311 0.0635 0.6245
LO -0.0643 0.4155 0.8771
TR 0.5314 0.28 0.0577
R2 0.0212 0.0415 0.609
R3 -0.0236 0.0423 0.5763
R4 -0.0285 0.0455 0.5304
R5 -0.1082 0.0622 0.082
R6 -0.1506 0.1151 0.1908
R7 -0.2095 0.2333 0.369
R8 -3.9097 38.056 0.9182
Lyon district 2 0.1035 0.1528 0.4981
Lyon district 3 -0.00049 0.1158 0.9966
Lyon district 4 0.0811 0.1341 0.5451
Lyon district 5 0.0215 0.1281 0.8668
Lyon district 6 0.0486 0.1254 0.6984
Lyon district 7 -0.1409 0.1209 0.2437
Lyon district 8 -0.0628 0.133 0.6367
Lyon district 9 -0.0828 0.1366 0.5443
Marseille unknown district 0.1037 0.1469 0.4801
Marseille district 1 0.0406 0.1613 0.8012
Marseille district 2 0.2037 0.2198 0.3541
Marseille district 3 0.1572 0.169 0.3523
Marseille district 4 0.2535 0.1499 0.0908
Marseille district 5 0.1774 0.16 0.2674
Marseille district 6 0.2102 0.1511 0.164
Marseille district 7 -0.0441 0.1658 0.7901
Marseille district 8 0.2443 0.1404 0.0818
Marseille district 9 0.1336 0.1454 0.3581
Marseille district 10 0.0597 0.1821 0.7431
Marseille district 11 0.2353 0.2147 0.2729
Marseille district 12 0.2036 0.1672 0.2233
Marseille district 13 0.0122 0.1734 0.944
Marseille district 14 0.6045 0.1886 0.0014
Marseille district 15 0.5167 0.1707 0.0025
Marseille district 16 -0.0761 0.3532 0.8295
Lille -0.2079 0.1066 0.0646
Roubaix -0.2115 0.11 0.2385
Tourcoing -0.4133 0.1212 0.0326
Bordeaux -0.153 0.1933 0.1644
Montpellier -0.0568 0.1191 0.639
Nancy 0.1304 0.1082 0.2733
Nantes 0.0412 0.1795 0.6934
Rennes 0.0397 0.1125 0.7136
Strasbourg 0.0928 0.1086 0.393
Toulouse -0.0483 0.1045 0.6502
Log-likelihood (110) 262.8 <.0001
Table 4 │Probit estimates of broker use as a function of hedonic characteristics
Omitted category variables are: period of construction A, Standard apartment, one-room apartment, and Lyon district 1. We 
do not report all the variables only the ones of major interest.
34Sample Coefficient Std Error Significance level Average PM2
Full sample 28.04 10.72 0.0089 2176.38
Cities
Bordeaux 9.53 37.35 0.7987 2059.12
LRT 85.00 40.33 0.0354 2034.19
Lyon 56.74 21.89 0.0096 2381.66
Marseille 74.47 29.06 0.0105 2328.93
Montpellier 54.96 74.81 0.463 2237.09
Nancy 12.39 46.87 0.7917 1572.68
Nantes -65.31 31.18 0.0364 2175.39
Rennes -41.42 33.33 0.2143 2210.90
Strasbourg -13.00 34.43 0.7058 1888.58
Toulouse 52.11 30.86 0.0916 2106.68
Number of rooms
R1 80.44 31.90 0.0118 2345.23
R2 41.79 21.51 0.0521 2203.50
R3 -11.12 18.83 0.555 2127.26
R4 2.59 21.03 0.9021 2071.00
R5 25.82 41.10 0.5301 2172.06
R6 -21.26 110.59 0.8479 2378.01
Construction code
A 189.58 96.60 0.0511 2449.91
B 88.87 44.16 0.0446 2293.41
C 97.03 37.59 0.01 2180.06
D 40.00 19.15 0.0368 2006.50
E  0.50 24.68 0.984 2053.83
F 7.47 25.52 0.7696 2236.64
G -64.83 36.00 0.072 2602.52
H -21.04 32.24 0.5142 2134.29
Buyer age
Age 18-29 -9.64 18.75 0.6074 2093.85
Age 30-39 37.66 19.78 0.057 2142.36
Age 40-49 80.40 26.29 0.0023 2204.35
Age 50-59 24.16 29.80 0.4177 2250.93
Age 60-69 -8.38 47.76 0.8608 2323.93
Age 70-79 -49.52 75.34 0.5117 2426.58
Age 80 and over -456.00 618.21 0.4847 2229.61
Seller age
Age 18-29 9.65 36.83 0.7934 2267.72
Age 30-39 9.49 20.44 0.6426 2284.74
Age 40-49 62.90 26.75 0.0188 2197.94
Age 50-59 61.19 24.53 0.0127 2165.95
Age 60-69 51.24 27.33 0.061 2122.05
Age 70-79 -27.61 38.22 0.4702 2070.06
Age 80 and over 90.77 50.16 0.0709 1929.19
Table 5 │House price estimates
The dependent variable is PM2. The values of the coefficient RE for the full and subsambles are presented.
The functional form of the equation for each sample is: PM2= ƒ(hedonic characteristics, RE).
35Sample Coefficient Std Error Significance level Average PM2
Buyer socio-occupational category 
SOC2 55.97 49.95 0.263 2128.78
SOC3 -28.07 21.71 0.1962 2330.19
SOC4 40.39 17.78 0.0232 2126.13
SOC5 24.84 25.77 0.3354 2040.37
SOC6 23.35 39.06 0.5502 1854.74
SOC7 24.87 36.67 0.4978 2310.12
SOC8 196.84 71.81 0.0065 2224.88
Seller socio-occupational category 
SOC2 8.79 49.65 0.8595 2250.89
SOC3 22.38 23.87 0.3484 2330.64
SOC4 25.13 20.35 0.217 2207.24
SOC5 62.23 29.77 0.0368 2139.02
SOC6 107.54 52.87 0.0427 1970.84
SOC7 29.30 21.07 0.1643 2064.06
SOC8 34.39 59.28 0.5621 2119.93
Buyer matrimonial status
Single woman 8.28 24.72 0.7378 2160.36
Single man 56.93 19.78 0.004 2108.32
Married woman 92.30 71.03 0.195 2207.05
Married man -7.38 18.97 0.6971 2235.07
Remarried man -9061.37 4441.91 0.2902 2271.15
Widow 105.28 81.65 0.199 2257.60
Widower -561.42 519.41 0.3156 2274.16
Seller matrimonial status
Single woman 28.36 37.21 0.4462 2200.47
Single man 69.91 28.45 0.0141 2232.64
Married woman 43.41 40.85 0.2883 2123.92
Married man 10.11 16.05 0.5285 2201.02
Remarried man -57.32 114.55 0.6179 2168.54
Widow 89.65 40.96 0.0289 2021.67
Widower 71.02 104.12 0.497 1923.88
Table 5 │House price estimates (continued)
The dependent variable is PM2. The values of the coefficient RE for the full and subsambles are presented.
The functional form of the equation for each sample is: PM2= ƒ(hedonic characteristics, RE).
36